Piper Alpha Disaster Essays

Piper Alpha Disaster Essays Piper Alpha Disaster Paper Piper Alpha Disaster Paper Abstract Piper Alpha was operated by Occidental Petroleum. The platform began its production in 1976, first as an oil production and then later converted to oil and gas production. In the night of July 6th 1988, the platform was engulfed in a catastrophic fire, which caused the death of 167 men and cost billions of dollars in property damage. There are only 61 survivors who saved their lives by jump off the platform in to the sea. At the time of the disaster, the Piper Alpha disaster was the worst offshore disaster in terms of live lost and industry impact. There are two main factors that lead to the disaster, which are human factor and the design and process factor. Lord Cullen has made some recommendations on improvements and preventions on the offshore installations. The improvements and preventions are the Permit to Work System should be taken seriously when there are any maintenance works on being carried out on the platform. The offshore platform management should provide good training and well prepared their workers in emergency procedures when emergency situations. Besides, the two improvements and preventions, the offshore platform management should upgraded their fire walls to blast walls, to prevent the fire walls from disintegrated on the gas explosion, penetrating oil and gas pipe lines that can lead to fire. 1. Introduction 2. 1 Background of Piper Alpha The Piper Alpha Oil Production platform was located about 120 miles northeast of Aberdeen, Scotland and built it for the Piper Field in the North Sea. The Piper Field was, discovered by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd. in January 1973, with the Piper Alpha platform becoming operational in 1976. 2. 2 The purpose of Piper Alpha operation The Piper Alpha platform had been designed as an oil production platform at first, but then the Piper Alpha platform went through several modification and redesigns to accommodate increased gas and oil production for the fields nearby. This redesigning make the Piper Alpha platform changed from a pure oil production platform to an oil and gas production platform in late 1980. A sub-sea pipeline, shared with the Claymore platform, connected Piper Alpha to the Flotta oil terminal on the Orkney Islands. Piper Alpha also had gas pipelines connecting it to both the Tartan platform and to the separate MCP-01 gas-processing platform. In total, Piper Alpha had four main transport risers: An oil export risers, The Claymore risers, The Tartan gas riser and The MCP-01 gas riser. The image below shows the locations of the platforms in the North Sea with their associated oil and gas terminals. 2. 3 What had happen to Piper Alpha Piper Alpha platform was engulfed in a catastrophic fire on July 6th 1988. The disaster caused the death of 167 men out of 228 men, which are 165 men on board of the Piper Alpha platform, and other two men on board a rescue vessel. The Piper Alpha disaster all began with a routine maintenance procedure. The Piper Alpha platform consists of two groups of workers, which are morning shift workers and night shift workers. On the morning of the 6th of July 1988, the morning shift workers have removed a gas condensate pump from service for maintenance of its Pressure Safety Valve (PSV). The Piper Alpha platform had two such pumps (gas condensate pump), which has been indicated as Pump A and Pump B. When the routine maintenance work had being carried out, the Pump A had been isolated and shut down. The maintenance work could not be completed by the end of morning shift worker finish their work, so they have been given permission to leave the rest of the maintenance work to be continued on the next day. Temporarily the PSV had been installed with a plate; this was to ensure to keep debris out of the pipework while the PSV was maintained. But the plate was not been installed tightly. Unfortunately, the night shift workers do not aware of this. The night shift workers had not been informed by the morning shift worker, that the Pump A as been isolated and shut down for maintenance work and temporarily installed a plate at the PSV. After few hours, the night shift workers took over from the morning shift workers, the primary condensate pump failed. None of the night shift workers were aware that a crucial part of the pump had been removed and decided to start the backup pump. Gas escaped from the hole left by the valve which was not closed tightly. Gas audibly leaked out at high pre ssure, ignited and exploded and produces a catastrophic fire which blown through the fire walls. The fire from the explosion had destroyed some of the oil lines and soon larger quantities of stored oil were burning out of control. An automatic system, which has been designed to spray water on such fire, had been turned off. Moreover, the accommodations were design in such a way that not smoke-proofed. Some of the workers realized that the only way to survive would be by jumping in to the sea and hoping to be rescued by boat. Only 61 men were survived, but most of them died due to suffocated carbon monoxide and fumes in the accommodations area on the Piper Alpha platform. . 4 The purpose of this report The purpose of the report is to examine the objectives and structures of the management of Piper Alpha platform for the oil and gas production industry in the North Sea, United Kingdom. Other than to examine the objectives and structures of the management of Piper Alpha, this report also is written to examine the causes of the explosion and the subsequent inquiry into the incident that claimed 167 men lives, and also how to improve in the management systems so that to prevent the Piper Alpha accident from occurring. 2. Management and Operation of Piper Alpha 3. 5 The Management and the Objectives of Piper Alpha Piper Alpha started its operation as a pure oil production platform in the North Sea approximately 170 miles northeast of Aberdeen, Scotland in 144 meters of water and comprised four modules separated by firewalls. McDermott Engineering at Ardersier and UIE at Cherbourg constructed the Piper Alpha platform. For safety reasons, they had made sure the Piper Alpha modules were organized so that the most dangerous operations were distant from nearby platform. Few years later, when the platform being converted from pure oil production to oil and gas production, it broke this safety concept. By this conversion, the sensitive areas were brought together to each other. The Tartan and Claymore platforms were installed in the Piper Field nearby to the Piper Alpha platform after the Piper Alpha platform being installed in the Piper Field. These two newly installed platforms also producing crude oil and gas and their export oil lines joining Piper Alpha’s oil export line to the Flotta terminal. After several modifications, the Piper Alpha platform then became a hub, processing its own gas, collecting gas from the Tartan platform and pumping this gas on to the MCP-01 platform. A pipeline was installed linking Piper Alpha platform to Claymore platform, receiving and supplying gas to Claymore platform as required for gas lifting purposes. At the time of the disaster Piper Alpha was one of the heaviest platforms operating in the North Sea. 3. Causes of the Piper Alpha Disaster 4. 6 The Causes of the Piper Alpha Disaster Later that year, in November, Department of Energy from United Kingdom Government Body who responsible for the operation and safety of offshore oil and gas installation has appointed Lord Cullen, a very experienced Scottish Jurist, to conduct a Public Inquiry in to the cause of the Piper Alpha disaster. Later by the end of year 1990, Lord Cullen has concluded and published his inquiry on the Piper Alpha disaster. The causes of the Piper Alpha disaster based on the Lord Cullen Inquiry are as follows. There are two main factors that lead to the Piper Alpha disaster which are Human Factors and Design and Process Factors. 4. 7. 1 Human Factor Permit to Work (PTW) is a document that notes the identity and location of the component that the work is to be carried out. In any offshore platform installations the PTW must be raised before any work can be carried out. PTW is an extensive, normally foolproof safety document kept in the platform control room. Once the work completed, the PTW is signed off and filed for future reference. On the morning of the disaster, the morning shift workers have removed a gas condensate pump (Pump A) from service for maintenance of its PSV, so the PTW was still ‘live’ and in force. It appears the Permit to Work System had become too relaxed with no verbal confirmation taking place at shift handovers from the morning shift workers to the night shift workers. Later, it has been discovered that, this was one of the main factor that lead to the Piper Alpha disaster. 4. 7. 2 Design and Process Factor McDermott Engineering at Ardersier and UIE at Cherbourg had constructed the Piper Alpha platform. For safety reasons, they had made sure the Piper Alpha modules were organized so that the most dangerous operations were distant from nearby platforms. After the Piper Alpha platform being converted from pure oil production to oil and gas production, the sensitive areas were brought together to each other. Like the Tartan platform and the Claymore platform. By this major conversion, it has been broken the safety concept that had been introduce earlier upon the construction of Piper Alpha. When the explosion occurs, the Tartan platform and Claymore platform continued to supply their products to the Piper Alpha platform, despite the fire from the Piper Alpha platform visible to the workers on the Tartan and Claymore platforms. Although it had been said that the explosion caused by the escape of gas from the PSV of Piper Alpha platform was the initial cause of the disaster, the major failure and rupture of the gas risers were responsible for Piper Alpha’s destruction and preventing the Piper Alpha workers evacuation. Although the Piper Alpha platform does have fire walls, they were not upgraded to blast walls. The fire walls in the platform were disintegrated on the gas explosion, penetrating oil and gas pipe lines and machinery, adding to the fire. Moreover, the Piper Alpha accommodations for the workers were not smoke-proofed and the lack of training that caused the Piper Alpha platform workers to repeatedly open and close the accommodation doors only worsened the problem. Some of the platform workers realized that the only way to survive is to escape from the Piper Alpha platform. However, the workers found the routes to life boats were blocked by the flames and smoke. Only 61 men were survived by jumping in to the sea but the other 167 men died due to suffocated carbon monoxide and fumes in the accommodations area on the Piper Alpha platform. 4. The Improvement and Prevention on the Offshore Installations Based on the Lord Cullen inquiry on the Piper Alpha disaster, we have known that there are two main factors that lead to the Piper Alpha disaster. Besides the findings of the factors that lead to the Piper Alpha disaster, Lord Cullen also has made some recommendations on improvements and preventions on any next offshore installations. There are some key lessons we can learn from the Piper Alpha disaster and made some improvements and preventions on the next offshore platforms. The improvements and prevention as follows: 5. 7 Permit to Work System The Permit to Work System was a system of documents that had been designed to have communications between all the workers on the platform that had been involved in any maintenance work that being carried out on the platform. Based on the Lord Cullen Inquiry, the permit to work system on the Piper Alpha platform became too relaxed on this system. There were also no formal verbal communication or confirmation that been done on shift handovers. In the earlier place, if the Permit to Work system had been implemented properly, the initial gas leak would never had occurred and lead to the explosion. So, the managements of offshore platforms should take a look this system seriously because it would save lots of lives of the workers. 5. 8 Safety training to the workers As we know, the accommodations on the Piper Alpha platform were not smoke-proofed. The workers on the Piper Alpha platform were not well trained in the emergency situations, the workers frequently open and close the accommodation doors and this only worsened the problem. The Piper Alpha management also was not responsible and not well trained to make up the gap and provide good leadership during emergency situations. The offshore platforms management should provide good training to their workers and well prepared their workers in emergency procedures when emergency situations. The managements also should take the responsibility and make up the gap and provide good leadership during emergency situations. 5. 9 Fire walls upgrading Although the Piper Alpha platform do had fire walls, but the fire walls was useless due to the Piper Alpha platform productions. At the time of the disaster, Piper Alpha platform were producing oil and gas. The fire walls should have been upgraded or improved to the blast walls, after the conversion had been made to the Piper Alpha platform from pure oil production to oil and gas production. If the fire walls in the Piper Alpha platform had been upgraded to blast walls, it would have withstood the initial explosion containing the resultant fire to the accommodations in the Piper Alpha platform. Therefore, all the offshore platform management should upgrade or improved their fire walls to blast walls, to prevent the fire walls from disintegrated on the gas explosion, penetrating oil and gas pipe lines that can lead to fire. 5. 10 Temporary Refuge The workers, who died in the Piper Alpha disaster, due to suffocated carbon monoxide and fumes in the accommodations area on the Piper Alpha platform. Based on this situation, we can conclude that the management of Piper Alpha platform does not provide safe accommodations to its workers. The offshore platforms management should learn from this major error and prevent this error repeat again by introduce or improve their current workers accommodations to Temporary Safety Refuge. This Temporary Safety Refuge should be designed in such a way that, the refuge has a breathable atmosphere through prevention of smoke ingress and provision of fire protection. This temporary safety refuge is a temporary shelter to the workers until evacuation is arranged. . 11 Evacuation and Escape At the moment of the Piper Alpha disaster, some of the Piper Alpha platform workers realized the only way to survived is to escape from the Piper Alpha platform immediately. Unfortunately, the routes to the life boats were blocked by the smoke and flames. Only 61 men were lucky enough to survive, as they made a jump to the sea and hoping to be survived by the res cue boats. The management of offshore platforms should earlier designed more than one route to the lifeboats or helicopter to ensure evacuation of the platform in emergency situations. The offshore platforms management should provide the secondary escape routes such as ropes, nets and ladders as a backup for the more sophisticated methods. 5. Conclusion Piper Alpha Oil Production platform was located about 120 miles northeast of Aberdeen and built it for Piper Field in the North Sea. The Piper Alpha platform had been designed as an oil production platform at first, but then the Piper Alpha platform went through several modifications and been changed from pure oil production to oil and gas production. Piper Alpha platform was engulfed in a catastrophic fire on July 6th 1988. The disaster caused the death of 167 men and with only 61 men as survivors. The disaster also cost billions of dollars in property damage. At the time of the disaster, the Piper Alpha platform accounted approximately 10% of North Sea oil and gas production. Later, the disaster was known as the worst offshore disaster in terms of live lost and industry impact. On November 1988, Cullen Inquiry was set up to find out the cause of the Piper Alpha. Based on the Cullen Inquiry, we can learn some key lessons from the Piper Alpha disaster and we can improve and do some prevention on the other offshore platforms. The first lesson we can learn and improve is the Permit to Work System. Based on the Cullen Inquiry, the Permit to Work System on the Piper Alpha platform became too relaxed and there were no formal verbal confirmation that been done on shift handovers. The management offshore platforms should take a look this system seriously. The second lesson that we can learn from is to provide safety training to the workers. The offshore platforms management should provide good safety training and well prepared their workers in emergency situations. The fire walls should be upgraded to blast walls. This upgrading is to prevent the fire walls from disintegrated on the gas explosion, penetrating oil and gas pipe lines that lead to fire. The offshore platforms management should provide temporary safety refuge and provide more than one route to the lifeboats or helicopter to ensure evacuation of the platform in emergency situations. The management also should provide the secondary escape route such as ropes, nets and ladders as a backup for the more sophisticated methods.