Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism Essay -- Philosophy Philosophi

Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism ABSTRACT: To the question "Why should I be moral?" there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows, I show that the SA and SR are unsatisfactory; they share a serious defect. To the question, "Why should I be moral?" there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows I show that SA and SR are unsatisfactory; they share a serious defect. I will interpret "Why should I be moral?" to mean "Why should I habitually perform the outward deeds prescribed by morality? Why, when I’m tempted to cheat or steal, ignore the sufferings of others, or renege on my commitments, should I do what morality calls for, and hence refrain from cheating and stealing, relieve the sufferings of others, and honor my commitments? Why should I go in for such things when so many other lifestyles are possible — for instance, that of a Gauguin or of a master criminal?" Perhaps the question has other meanings, but this is a natural one, and one to which SA and SR are meant to apply. Interpreting the question this way removes some unclarity from the phrase "be moral." But it removes no ambiguities that might stem from the word "should." SA and SR purport to do this. SA, briefly put, is this: "Why should I be moral?" is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd; in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ...t then, a page later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats "Why should I be moral?" as something more complicated than a request for a reason. The trouble is that Sterba’s "altruistic reasons" are among the things Foot calls moral considerations. Thus, he has not engaged Foot’s argument; he has made exactly the assumption her argument challenges. (9) A similar objection has been used against Foot. See Robert L. Holmes, "Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" Analysis 34 (1973): 96–100. Foot’s reply to it, which differs from mine, is in "‘Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?’ A Reply to Mr. Holmes," Analysis 35 (1974): 53–56. (10) I discuss these and related distinctions in "Motivation and Practical Reasons," Erkenntnis 47 (1997): 105–27. Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism Essay -- Philosophy Philosophi Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism ABSTRACT: To the question "Why should I be moral?" there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows, I show that the SA and SR are unsatisfactory; they share a serious defect. To the question, "Why should I be moral?" there is a simple answer (SA) that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response (SR), to the simple answer. In what follows I show that SA and SR are unsatisfactory; they share a serious defect. I will interpret "Why should I be moral?" to mean "Why should I habitually perform the outward deeds prescribed by morality? Why, when I’m tempted to cheat or steal, ignore the sufferings of others, or renege on my commitments, should I do what morality calls for, and hence refrain from cheating and stealing, relieve the sufferings of others, and honor my commitments? Why should I go in for such things when so many other lifestyles are possible — for instance, that of a Gauguin or of a master criminal?" Perhaps the question has other meanings, but this is a natural one, and one to which SA and SR are meant to apply. Interpreting the question this way removes some unclarity from the phrase "be moral." But it removes no ambiguities that might stem from the word "should." SA and SR purport to do this. SA, briefly put, is this: "Why should I be moral?" is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd; in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ...t then, a page later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats "Why should I be moral?" as something more complicated than a request for a reason. The trouble is that Sterba’s "altruistic reasons" are among the things Foot calls moral considerations. Thus, he has not engaged Foot’s argument; he has made exactly the assumption her argument challenges. (9) A similar objection has been used against Foot. See Robert L. Holmes, "Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" Analysis 34 (1973): 96–100. Foot’s reply to it, which differs from mine, is in "‘Is Morality a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?’ A Reply to Mr. Holmes," Analysis 35 (1974): 53–56. (10) I discuss these and related distinctions in "Motivation and Practical Reasons," Erkenntnis 47 (1997): 105–27.